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Economic growth through the development process
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss some recent research in the area of economic growth and development
emphasizing the endogenous dynamics of policies and organizational forms in a world characterized by
credit-market and labor-market imperfections. I present a simple model of technological convergence
featuring an endogenous evolution of contractual arrangements. The key assumption is that economic
growth is associated with investments as well as with the adoption and imitation of existing technologies
in economies lying far from the technology frontier. In contrast, growth is increasingly driven by
innovation as economies approach the technological frontier. The theory predicts that contractual
arrangements evolve and adapt spontaneously to the changing needs of technological progress.
However, this evolution is neither necessary nor serendipitous. Economies that fail to introduce
economic reforms as they advance may become stuck in non-convergence traps. I discuss a number of
empirical applications, including the wave of reforms of industrial policy in India in the 1980s and
1990s.
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In the second half of the XXth Century, the world economy experienced unprecedented
progress in the material standards of living; the income per capita increased, on average,
four-fold between 1950 and 2000. Moreover, especially in the last twenty years, the
developing world as a whole has grown signiﬁcantly faster than has the industrialized
one, leading to an absolute reduction in income inequality and poverty. The global
experience has its dark sides, however. The development boom is mainly an Asian
phenomenon, initially localized in the Paciﬁc region and more recently spreading to
India and China. On the opposite extreme, the standards of living have been stagnating
in sub-Saharan Africa, and actually fell during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, large
cross-country diﬀerences in the standards of living persist. The average GDP per capita
of non-OECD countries in year 2000 remains under that of the United States a century
earlier, while 32 sub-Saharan African countries still subsist on an annual per capita GDP
of less than 2000 US dollars.
Why do standards of living remain persistently diﬀerent? Why are some develop-
ing countries closing the gap, while others are stagnating and remain stuck in poverty
traps? Which policies and institutional arrangements can help developing economies
grow and make the transition from relative poverty to prosperity, and which hinder
these objectives? To date, there is no consensus answer to such important questions.
The modern theory of economic growth has focused on the determinants of capital
accumulation and innovation in industrialized economies, extrapolating its message to
developing economies. The ensuing policy recommendations tend to be of the "one-size-
ﬁts-all" type. The right road for development — the orthodox doctrine maintains — is to
let markets do their job. Governments should step away of any direct involvement in
the economic process, and limit their action to favor, in both developing and developed
countries, legal enforcement, property right protection, product and labor market lib-
eralization, and monetary and ﬁscal stability. Many development economists, however,
question the usefulness of this approach. They believe that the process of economic
development diﬀers qualitatively from the growth process in industrialized economies
and that its analysis requires a diﬀerent focus and even diﬀerent theories.
In this paper, I present a theory that attempts to unify these two diﬀerent approaches
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to the process of development. The key observation is that economic growth in industries
and economies far from the technology frontier takes the form of adoption and imitation
of existing technologies and capital accumulation in already existing lines of business. In
contrast, the potential for growth by simply adopting existing technologies in technolog-
ically more advanced industries and economies is limited; as a result, innovation drives
much of growth here. Imitation and innovation require diﬀerent organizational forms,
diﬀerent relations between entrepreneurs and credit markets, and diﬀerent processes of
selection of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms. Consequently, the theory predicts a close link be-
tween distance to frontier, on the one hand, and organizational forms, market relations,
and institutions, on the other.
There are two building blocks to this approach. First, institutions, ﬁrms’ organiza-
tions, and more general contractual relationships between individual agents and social
groups evolve and adapt spontaneously to the changing needs of the process of techno-
logical progress. Thus, the adoption of appropriate institutions, i.e., institutions that
promote growth in a particular stage of development and under speciﬁc local conditions,
is in part an equilibrium phenomenon. Even political institutions respond to the endoge-
nous pressure for changes; the process of democratization in the last quarter of century
was more often the result of the internal collapse of autocratic regimes which proved
unable to deliver acceptable levels of economic eﬃciency than the outcome of interna-
tional pressure or intervention. This transformation, however, is not serendipitous and
by no means a historical necessity; it is, in contrast, subject to high uncertainty, perils,
and path dependence. Developing countries often successfully adopt arrangements at an
early stage of the process of economic development that diﬀer from those industrialized
economies countries implement. However, it is not uncommon for such arrangements
to become barriers to growth at later stages of the process of development. The ability
or failure to introduce economic reforms then becomes key: some countries manage to
sustain or even accelerate their convergence by reforming their policies and institutions,
while others fail to reform obsolete and inappropriate policies. Politico-institutional lock-
in can lead the process of technological development to a halt. The theory attempts to
identify determinants of success and failure.
A key distinction in my approach lies in the diﬀerentiation between rigid and ﬂexible
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policies and institutions. Rigid policies include long-term contracts, trade and entry
barriers, licensing systems, selective investment subsidies, employment protection and
regulations reducing labor mobility, selective credit markets, and direct intervention of
governments in corporate governance. Such policies are often described as barriers to
economic growth and technology adoption that rise and persist due to political failures,
such as the capture of politicians by vested interests and powerful minorities of insiders.
However, there are numerous historical examples in which rigid institutions have been
successful in promoting growth. These include the late industrialization experiences of
Germany, Italy, and Russia. More recently, the import-substitution strategy of many
Latin American countries seemed capable of sustaining high growth during the 1950s
and 60s, although these countries later entered a profound crisis.
Albeit altogether diﬀerent, the growth strategies of the major East-Asian economies,
such as Korea and Japan, during the postwar period, were also characterized by many
rigid elements. For instance, these economies relied on large integrated (and politically
protected) ﬁrms, as well as long-term relationships between ﬁrms, banks and ﬁrms, and
ﬁrms and employees. Some aspects of the process of technological catch-up in some
continental European economies until the 1970s also ﬁt this picture. For instance, Italy
grew successfully for several decades after World War II through the adoption of highly
interventionistic industrial policies, characterized by strong links between large (often
state-controlled) banks and ﬁrms, and a politically entrenched economic leadership.
These models contrast in many respects with the more ﬂexible, competition-oriented
institutions that prevailed in the United States or other Anglo-Saxon economies. Our
theory framework highlights the forces behind the emergence of diﬀerent organizational
forms and the complex transformation taking place throughout the process of economic
development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark
theory. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and discusses two applications. In Section
4 we discuss some empirical evidence, both at the individual-country and at the cross-
country level. Section 5 discusses an extension of the theory and its empirical application
to the liberalization reforms in India. Section 6 concludes.
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In this section, I present a workhorse model based on Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti
(2002 and 2006), hereafter referred to as AAZ. The production side of the economy
consists of a unique ﬁnal good, assumed to be the numéraire. This good is produced
competitively using a continuum of intermediate inputs according to:
yt =
∫
1
0
(At (i))
1−αxt (i)
α di, (1)
where At (i) is the productivity of the intermediate good in intermediate sector i at time
t, xt(i) is the amount of intermediate good i used in the production of the ﬁnal good at
time t, and α ∈ (0, 1).
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist i ∈ [0, 1] at a unit marginal
cost. A competitive fringe of imitators can copy its technology and also produce an
identical intermediate good with productivity At (i), but its production activity is less
eﬃcient. In particular, fringe ﬁrms can produce at a marginal cost χ ∈ (1, 1/α) units
of ﬁnal good. This competitive fringe limits the monopoly power of the leading ﬁrm,
forcing the latter to set a limit price:
pt (i) = χ > 1. (2)
The parameter χ captures both technological factors and government regulations such
as barriers to entry or other competition policies. A higher χ corresponds to larger
barriers, i.e., a less competitive market. Given the demand implied by the ﬁnal goods
technology in (1) and the limit price in (2), the proﬁt of the leading monopolist in sector
i is given by:
πt (i) = δAt (i) , (3)
where δ ≡ (χ− 1)χ−
1
1−α is an increasing function of χmeasuring the extent of monopoly
power.
The process of economic growth is driven by technological progress, which is captured
in the model by increases in At (i). Technical progress can stem from two complementary
processes: (i) imitation (adoption of existing technologies); and (ii) innovation (discov-
ery or adaptation to local conditions of new technologies). To describe the innovation
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process, I ﬁrst deﬁne the average economy-wide productivity as At ≡
∫
1
0
At (i) di, while I
denote the productivity at the world frontier as A¯t, which is assumed to grow at the con-
stant rate g, A¯t = (1 + g) A¯t−1. Since I focus on the process of technological convergence,
I will maintain throughout the paper that At ≤ A¯t for all t. The process of imitation
and innovation leads to the following law of motion of each sector’s productivity:
At (i) = ηA¯t−1 + γAt−1 + εt (i) , (4)
where η > 0 and γ > 0, and εt (i) is a mean-zero random variable, capturing the feature
that there may be diﬀerences in innovation performance across sectors. Equation (4)
captures the two dimensions of productivity growth: imitation and innovation. ηA¯t−1
stands for advances in productivity coming from adoption of technologies from the fron-
tier (and thus depends on the productivity level of the frontier, A¯t−1), and γAt−1 stands
for the component of productivity growth stemming from innovation (building on the
existing knowledge stock at time t− 1, At−1).
Finally, I deﬁne at ≡ At/A¯t to be the measure of the country’s average proximity
(i.e., the inverse of the distance) to the technological frontier at date t. Integrating (4)
over i ∈ [0, 1], using the fact that εt (i) has mean zero, dividing both sides by A¯t and
use the law of motion A¯t = (1 + g) A¯t−1 leads to a simple linear relationship between a
country’s proximity to frontier at at date t and that at t− 1:
at =
1
1 + g
(η + γat−1). (5)
This equation shows how the process of technological convergence depends on imitation
and innovation activity. As a increases (i.e., as the country approaches the frontier),
innovation becomes relatively more important for growth. In contrast, when at−1 is
small, imitation activity is the main driving force of the growth process. I will use this
basic equation to describe a number of applications in which rigid arrangements and
institutions lead to a high η, whereas flexible arrangements and institutions lead to a
high γ.
The theory maintains the assumption that there is a trade-oﬀ between the innova-
tion and imitation activities carried out within ﬁrms. Contractual arrangements and the
internal organization of ﬁrms aﬀect the resolution of this trade-oﬀ. Long-term contracts
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between ﬁrms, between ﬁrms and banks or between ﬁrms and their managers foster, for
example, the undertaking of "large" investment projects involving the adoption (imita-
tion) of well established technologies. In contrast, higher turnover and generally more
ﬂexible arrangements, favor the selection of entrepreneurial skills and more eﬃcient
ﬁrm-worker matches, ultimately enhancing ﬁrms’ innovative capabilities.
Before discussing the theory in more detail, I report some evidence that innovative
activity, proxied by R&D investments, indeed increases with the distance to the tech-
nology frontier. This evidence is based on a study of Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen
(2004) using data from the OECD sectoral database for the years 1974-1990. I deﬁne the
“proximity to frontier” (i.e., the inverse of distance to frontier) for an industry, PTFict,
as the total factor productivity (TFP) in industry i in country c at time t divided by
the highest TFP in industry i at time t in the sample. Table 1 (borrowed from AAZ)
shows the correlation between the “proximity to frontier” and the R&D intensity, (R&D
divided by sales) with or without controlling for country and industry eﬀects. The ﬁrst
three columns use a measure of PTFict without correcting for diﬀerences in skills and
hours, whereas the last three columns use a measure that corrects for these diﬀerences.
As the table shows, country-industries closer to their respective frontier are more R&D
intensive.1 Moreover, the more rapidly an industry in any country approaches the world
technology frontier, the more it becomes relatively R&D intensive. This is consistent
with the view that R&D is more important in industries or countries closer to the world
technology frontier.
TABLE 1
3 Iusc P  Cusc R

I assume that a manager runs each ﬁrm. The relationship between the ﬁrm and its man-
ager is subject to informational imperfections raising a standard agency problem. I dis-
cuss two alternative applications characterized by diﬀerent informational problems. Fol-
1As the comparison between the diﬀerent column reveals, the inclusion of country, industry and
country-industry dummies reduces the estimated eﬀect, suggesting that part of the raw correlation
between innovation and distance to frontier comes from between-industry and between-country (e.g.,
institutional) comparisons. However, the estimated coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant even in the
more demanding speciﬁcation of columns 3 and 6 that only uses within variation.
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lowing AAZ, I assume that the parameters η and γ in (5) are functions of the (physical-
or human-capital) investments the agent undertakes and the contractual arrangement
between the principal and the agent.
3.1 P-C	 I
	
	
In the ﬁrst application, based on AAZ, there is imperfect information about the quality
(skills) of managers. There are two types of manager: high- and low-skill managers.
When a manager is ﬁrst hired, her ability is unknown; it is revealed over time through
her subsequent performance. There are two possible contractual regimes: “long-term
contracts”, R = 1, meaning that managers are not ﬁred even if they are revealed to
be low skill, and “short-term contracts”, R = 0, implying that the process of “creative
destruction” replaces low-skill managers with new managers of unknown ability.
Managers have human skills but they cannot borrow, due to credit market imper-
fections. In contrast, ﬁrms have deep pockets but no skills. Due to a standard moral
hazard problem (they can “steal the output”) managers must earn ex-post rents to be
induced to behave. Since ﬁrms pay the investment costs but must share the returns with
their managers, investments tend to remain below their eﬃcient level. Long-term con-
tracts induce insider managers to use their retained earnings to ﬁnance the investments.
Thus, long-term contracts mitigate the underinvestment problem. Many of the active
managers in the economy will have low skills and will be less innovative, however, under
long-term contracts.
3.2 F-S Husc
-C	 I
	
	
In the alternative scenario, the principal-agent relationship is subject to a two-side moral-
hazard problem. Firm-manager matches are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that make
some matches more productive than others. For simplicity, matches can either be good
or bad. Neither party knows if a match is good or bad at the time of initiation of a
relationship, but this information becomes public after the ﬁrst period of production.
The quality of the match aﬀects the ﬁrm’s innovative capability.
Young managers can make a costly ﬁrm-speciﬁc human-capital investment that has
no value outside of the existing employment relationship. The investment is also speciﬁc
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to the technology in use, and does not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s innovative capability. The invest-
ment is not contractible, raising a standard moral hazard problem. Young managers ﬁnd
it optimal to make the investment only if they anticipate certain reemployment with the
same ﬁrm in the following period; if not, they do not ﬁnd investment proﬁtable. Firms
would like, ex-ante, to sign a contract inducing their managers make the human capital
investment. However, they have limited (or no) commitment power, and their ex-post
incentive is to dissolve bad matches, irrespective of whether the manager has made the
human-capital investment.
Rt = 1 here indicates a lifetime employment regime, such that managers invest in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and ﬁrms retain all managers, irrespective of the quality of
the match. Rt = 0 is a short-term contract regime such that managers do not invest and
ﬁrms only continue the employment relationship when the match turns out to be good.
Employment legislation and ﬁrms’ managerial culture determine the cost of separation
and the prevailing contractual regime.
3.3 G	-M
 D

The crucial assumption is that managerial talent and/or match quality matter more for
innovation than for imitation. The resulting law of motion of the distance the frontier,
(5), takes the form
at =


1
1+g
(η¯ + γat−1) if Rt = 1
1
1+g
(η + γ¯at−1) if Rt = 0
(6)
where η¯ > η and γ¯ < γ < 1+g. The assumption that γ¯ < γ reﬂects the notion that high-
skill managers and well-matched ﬁrms are better at performing innovation. Short-term
contracts imply that relationships with low-skill managers (respectively, bad matches)
are severed, leading to a better pool of active managers (respectively, a better pool of
matches). The assumption that η¯ > η follows from the fact that long-term contracts
imply more investment in either physical or human capital. To the extent to which the
amount of imitation activity increases the rate of investment in existing technologies,
long-term contracts lead to more imitation, i.e., higher η.
I assume that g = η + γ¯ − 1, which ensures that an economy choosing short-term
contracts grows exactly at the rate g when it reaches the frontier. Figure 1 represent
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the dynamics under the two contractual regimes.
FIGURE 1
Figure 1 shows that the economy with long-term contracts (R = 1) achieves greater
growth (higher level of at for given at−1) through the investments/imitation channel, but
lower growth through the innovation channel. In particular, In particular, the positive
intercept captures imitation while the slope coeﬃcient multiplied by at−1 captures in-
novation. The ﬁgure shows that the positive intercept is larger under R=1 whereas the
slope coeﬃcient is larger under R=0. The ﬁgure also shows that which regime maximizes
the growth rate of the economy depends on the level of at−1. In particular, there exists
a threshold distance-to-frontier level, aˆ ∈ (0, 1) , such that when at−1 < aˆ, long-term
contracts (R = 1) lead to greater growth, and when at−1 > aˆ, short-term contracts
(R = 0) achieves higher growth.
The growth-maximizing sequence starts with long-term contracts maximizing invest-
ments and imitation, and then switches to short-term contracts maximizing selection and
innovation. The result is very intuitive: investments and imitation are the main source
of growth for a very poor economy; long-term contracts are then eﬃcient. However, as
the economy comes suﬃciently close to the frontier, innovation becomes the main source
of growth. Short-term contracts then become eﬃcient as they induce greater selection
and innovative capability.
3.4 Euscusc.
Consider the environment of section 3.1. There is no guarantee that the equilibrium con-
tractual arrangements attain eﬃciency. As shown more formally in AAZ, the equilibrium
organization takes the following form:
Ret =


1 if at−1 < ar (δ)
0 if at−1 ≥ ar (δ)
,
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where ar is an increasing function of δ, and generically ar (δ) = aˆ. The more anti-
competitive the policy, the larger the range of a such that the economy chooses long-
term contracts. The intuition is as follows: when managers earn high rents, there is
more scope for them to invest large retained earnings into their businesses. They then
become more attractive to ﬁnanciers than in economies where ﬁrms earn lower proﬁts
and therefore have lower retained earnings to inject into the investment process.
Rather than analyzing the problem in general (as is done in AAZ), I will consider a
simpliﬁed case in which the government can choose between two competitive regimes,
high competition (δ) and low competition (δ¯). Suppose, in addition that
ar (δ) < aˆ < ar
(
δ¯
)
,
and a0 > ar (δ) . Figure 2 describes this example. The red and the green lines yield
the equilibrium sequences under the low competition (RIGID) and high competition
(FLEX) industrial-policy regimes, respectively. Short-term contracts is the equilibrium
arrangement for all a ≤ ar (δ) ≡ aFLEX under the high-competition regime; the econ-
omy switches then to long-term contracts for a ≥ aFLEX .. In contrast, long-term con-
tracts is the equilibrium arrangement for a ≤ ar
(
δ¯
)
≡ aRIG under the low-competition
regime; the economy switches then to long-term contracts for a ≥ aRIG. If I consider two
economies at diﬀerent stages of the development process, such as a0 ∈ (aFLEX , aˆ) and
a′0 ∈ (aˆ, aRIG), respectively, high competition is the appropriate (i.e., growth maximiz-
ing) policy for the richer economy (a′0), whereas low competition is the appropriate policy
for the poorer economy (a0). More precisely, the optimal policy for the poorer economy
consists of a temporary government intervention to restrict competition followed by a
liberalization reform (i.e., a switch from δ¯ to δ) as a ≥ a˜.
FIGURE 2
In the case shown in Figure 2, the competition policy only aﬀects the speed of
transition to the frontier, but not the long-term result. More extreme outcomes are
possible, however. In Figure 3, I show a cases where the high-competition regime lead to
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no investment activity for a range of low a’s, thus neither to imitation nor to innovation.2
The economy stagnates in absolute terms, and diverges from the frontier rather than
converging to it. Industrial policy aimed at limiting competition and strengthening the
incentive of incumbent ﬁrms to invest becomes then necessary to prevent the economy
from falling into this poverty trap.
FIGURE 3
Insisting on low-competition policy may be very hazardous, however. In both Figure
2 and Figure 3, a government insisting on the anti-competitive policy condemns the econ-
omy to a non-convergence trap. In this case, the state of technology converges to atrap but
there is no further convergence. In contrast, technology would converge to the frontier if
a pro-competitive reform were introduced. The condition for a non-convergence trap to
exist is that ar
(
δ¯
)
≡ aRIG > atrap, where atrap is pinned down by the intersection of the
dynamics when R = 1 and the 45-degree line (more formally, atrap ≡ η¯/
(
1 + g − γ
)
).3
Non-convergence traps are especially interesting. Encouraging investment-based growth,
by supporting existing, incumbent ﬁrms, may appear to be “appropriate policy”, but it
in fact condemns the economy to non-convergence. The resulting economy is an under-
developed one, unable to realize the structural transformation necessary for the process
of economic development.
Similar results are obtained in the human-capital investment environment of section
3.2. In a pure laissez-faire environment where ﬁrms cannot commit to retain managers if
the match turns out to be bad there are no ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments, resulting in a low
η. Human-capital investments are then suboptimally low condemning poor economies to
slow growth. Employment regulations (and/or cultural norms that force ﬁrms to inter-
nalize the cost of laying oﬀ their managers) enable ﬁrms to make credible promises that
all managers will be retained, at least as long as a is not too large. However, excessively
strict norms or ﬁring regulations backﬁre. Non-convergence traps such as those of Figure
2 emerge in economies where bad matches are not dissolved even if their continuation is
2This is a standard result in Schumpeterian models of innovation: low monopoly rents imply a corner
solution with zero innovative investments.
3More formally, a
trap
≡
η¯
1+g−γ
.
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very costly for innovation and growth. As in the previous case, encouraging ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments and managers’ loyalty to their employers may appear to be “appropriate
policy” at an early stage, but in fact it condemns the economy to non-convergence.
3.5 Susc
The discussion above highlighted how the equilibrium pattern of economic arrangements
may involve the organization of the economy in non-standard ways (long-term contracts,
limited competition, ﬁring regulations, etc.), and the process of economic growth brings
the structural transformation of these arrangements. It also highlighted how certain
policies, such as reducing product or labor market competition, may appear attractive
as a way of increasing growth temporarily, but can quickly turn into inappropriate
institutions, causing the economy to become trapped and stop converging to the world
technology frontier.
In fact, the danger of appropriate institutions turning into inappropriate institutions
increases signiﬁcantly once the analysis is expanded to incorporate political economy
features, where incumbent ﬁrms can lobby to inﬂuence equilibrium policies,. For exam-
ple, under the plausible assumption that economic power can buy political power, these
policies become easily entrenched once the economy adopts less competitive markets or
subsidies to investment. Existing policies and institutions thus enrich incumbent entre-
preneurs, who can then successfully lobby to maintain them (and thus prevent a switch
to the innovation-based equilibrium). Similarly, unions representing insider workers have
an incentive to lobby against labor market reforms.
These political-economy considerations therefore reiterate the fact that societies may
become trapped in a non-convergence pattern with inappropriate institutions and rela-
tively backward technologies, because earlier they adopted appropriate institutions for
their circumstances at the time, but in the process also created a powerful constituency
against change.
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The non-convergence trap and the associated political economy interactions may be
a good description of the experiences of a number of Latin American countries such
a Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, which grew relatively rapidly with import substitution
and protectionist policies until the mid-1970s, but then stagnated and were ultimately
surpassed by other economies with relatively more competitive policies.
Figure 4 shows the growth performance of Central and South American countries
at diﬀerent stages of their development processes. I plot the average growth rate over
ﬁve-year periods on the vertical axis, and the GDP per capita relative to the US at
the beginning of each ﬁve-year period on the horizontal axis. The continuous line is
for comparison. It represents the average growth rate across all non-OECD countries
in the world (not only in Central and South America), conditional on the distance to
frontier. Figure 4a plots the growth performance of the four largest Central and South
American countries: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia. All of these countries
actively engaged in import-substitution policies. Clearly, when their relative GDP lay
under 40%, these four countries outperformed the average non-OECD country at the
same level of development. But their performance was below average when their relative
GDP exceeded 40%.4
Figure 4b plots all Central and South American countries, and shows the same broad
pattern. One concern about Figures 4a and 4b is that the cross-sectional variation alone
drives the evidence. To address this concern, Figure 4c plots the growth rates controlling
for ﬁxed eﬀects. In this ﬁgure, each point represents the deviation of the growth rate
from the "usual growth rate" of the country in question. The construction of this panel
precludes any cross-sectional variation. The continuous line is now calculated as the
regression line of a convergence equation for the entire world sample after controlling for
ﬁxed eﬀects.5 As the ﬁgure shows, the performance of Latin American countries deteri-
orates at a faster rate than that of the average developing country. A likely explanation
4Note that the continuous line is positively sloped. This reﬂects the well-known fact: that there is
no absolute convergence across countries in the world.
5In contrast to the cross-sectional pattern, there is convergence in the ﬁxed-eﬀect regression as
indicated by the downward sloping line.
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for this pattern is the important-substitution and incumbent-protective policies many
countries in Latin America adopted. As this paper suggests, these policies appear to
have led to relatively rapid initial growth, followed by stagnation. Moreover, the polit-
ical economy of these countries suggests that the economic stagnation was associated
with a persistent inability to implement policy reforms.
FIGURE 4 (FOUR PANEL)
Our simple theory also sheds new light on the experiences of South Korea and Japan.
For much of the post-war period, both Korea and Japan achieved rapid growth and
convergence relying on high investment, large conglomerates, government subsidies, and
relatively protected internal markets. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) played a crucial role by regulating foreign currency allocations,
import licenses, and the extent of competition; by directing industrial activity; and by
encouraging investment by the keiretsu, the large groupings of industrial ﬁrms and banks
(e.g., Johnson, 1982, Evans, 1995, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2002). In Korea, the large family-
run conglomerates, the chaebol, appear to have played an important role, especially in
generating large investments and rapid technological development. The chaebol, similar
to the keiretsu in Japan, received strong government support in the form of subsidized
loans, anti-union legislation, and preferential treatment that sheltered them from both
internal and external competition. An additional important feature of both the chaebol
and the keiretsu was their low managerial turnover, emphasis on long-term relationships,
and generally rigid structures (e.g., Wade, 1990, Vogel, 1991, Evans, 1995).
In both Korea and Japan, a long period of convergence and growth came to an
end, in the mid-1980s in Japan, and during the Asian crisis in Korea. The Korean
case illustrates the politico-economic problems discussed above. For instance, Kang
(2002) argues that political more than economic considerations have been driving policy
making in Korea and that corruption was very widespread. Nevertheless, the crisis
appears to have eventually opened the way to reforms in Korea: a number of the chaebol
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went bankrupt, while others were split, or like Daewoo, were forced to restructure.
Political reforms seem to have weakened the highly entrenched politico-economic elite.
Interestingly, the speed of reforms seems to have been much slower in Japan. This may
explain why Korea has since rapidly managed to resume growth after the crisis, while
Japan’s economic performance continues to be weak.
This debate is also relevant for the process of liberalization and economic reforms
in continental European countries such as Italy, France, and Germany. Italy is an
emblematic case, as it experienced a very strong growth performance until the 1980s,
with productivity per worker growing at a 4.8% yearly rate in the period 1950-1980.
Italy then underwent a drastic slowdown, with labor productivity growing at a modest
annual rate of 1.4%. While other European countries have experienced weak economic
performance since the 1980s, that of Italy has been especially weak. In the period 1990-
2003, labor productivity growth fell further to just above 1%, the second lowest rate of
productivity growth among the G7, after Japan.6 The same industrial and competition
policies that fostered growth in the post-war era, characterized by a strong coordinating
role of government and banks, and support to large insider ﬁrms, seem to have become
inappropriate and to be among the causes of the weak performance in recent years.
Similarly, Italy has very tight regulations about dismissal of employees. In a recent
newspaper article, Francesco Giavazzi7 writes:
"The idea that the economy needs institutions in which the State and large banks
cooperate under the government’s direction was innovative in the 1930s and in the post-
war period, when Italy was a poor and backward country... Since then, more than half
century has past... In the 1950s and 1960s Italy – as later Japan and South Korea
– grew by adopting well-established technologies, most of them developed in the United
States: steel, automobile, household appliance industries. In that stage, in which large
investments yielding delayed returns were necessary, one needed stability, and hence
long-term relationships between industry and banks, stable ownership structures, low
managerial turnover, all characteristics of a financial system relying on large banks. A
6Labor productivity in the other G7 grew at the following annual rates in the period 1990-2003:
United Kindom 2%, United States 1.8%, Canada 1.8%, Germany 1.5%, France 1.1%, Japan 0.6%. All
data are from Penn World Table 6.2.
7"Why to privatize networks", Corriere della Sera, February 1, 2007, my translation.
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strong role of the State in the economy was no obstacle: much of the growth in the
1960s is due to IRI which controlled a good share of the Italian industry and several
major banks, and which has produced a generation of outstanding managers. But when
a country reaches the technology frontier, innovation becomes the key factor for growth.
And since it is mainly new firms that innovate, one needs lot of "creative destruction",
namely, an environment in which old firms close down and are replaced by new ones,
whose ownership is contestable, even that of banks".8
Many recent attempts to reform industrial policy have met resistance in Italy (see,
for example, the privatization of public utility networks and of Alitalia, Italy’s national
airline), showing how policies that were appropriate at an earlier stage tend to become
entrenched and to create a constituency opposing change when reform becomes necessary
to promote innovation-led growth.
4.2 E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In this section, I move from the discussion of individual countries to a more system-
atic cross-country analysis. An implication of the theory discussed above is that anti-
competitive policies, such as barriers to entry or trade restrictions, become increasingly
harmful as an economy approaches the technology frontier. To test this implication, I
consider a sample of non-OECD, non-socialist countries. I measure the distance to the
frontier by the GDP per capita relative to that of the U.S..
I ﬁrst consider barriers to entry. These are measured by the number of procedures
necessary for opening a new business (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer,
2002). The sample of countries includes all non-OECD (including, however, those that
joined the OECD in the 1990s, such as Korea and Mexico) and all non-socialist countries
for which I have data. Barriers are measured according to the “number of procedures to
open a new business” variable from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2002).
8IRI was a large state holding company founded in 1933 by Alberto Beneduce. IRI exercised some
original form of control on a number of large ﬁrms in the post-war Italian history. IRI closed its doors
in June 2000, being an example of the process of equilibrium institutional dynamics discussed in the
previous chapter.
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I estimate the following regression equation:
gi,t = α0 + α1Bi + α2
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
+ α3
(
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
·Bi
)
+ di + ft + εit.
gi,t is the growth rate in country i between t− 1 and t, Bi denotes the level of barriers
in country i, yi,t−1 is GDP per capita in country i at date t − 1, yUS,t−1 is GDP per
capita in the United States i at date t− 1, and the ft’s denote a full set of time eﬀects.
I take the time intervals to be 5 years. α3 is the coeﬃcient of interest, which the theory
predicts to be negative.
The results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 report, respectively, the results
of OLS regressions without and with country ﬁxed eﬀects (FE). Interestingly, the inter-
action eﬀects increase signiﬁcantly the point estimates (though, standard errors are also
larger)by controlling for unobservable (e.g., institutional) cross-country heterogeneity. A
problem with the speciﬁcation of column 2 is that models with ﬁxed eﬀects and lagged
dependent variables produce inconsistent estimates. To partially address this problem,
I report the results of IV regressions where proximity to frontier is instrumented by its
one-period lags in column 3.9 I furthermore control in column 4 for the education of the
labor force measured by years of schooling for males (from the Barro-Lee data set). The
interaction coeﬃcient, α3 (distance to frontier * barriers) is always negative and in most
cases statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that as they approach the frontier growth in
high-barrier countries slows down more relative to low-barrier countries.
TABLE 2
Next, I consider the degree of openness to international trade. Rather than using
the ratio of actual trade to GDP, which is a highly endogenous variable, I use the
degree of openness predicted by a standard "gravity" equation as in Frankel and Romer
9Lag dependent variables are, as usual, quite imperfect instruments. However, it is not easy — and
outside the scope of this paper — to ﬁnd variables that aﬀect barriers to entry and have no indepen-
dent eﬀect on growth in cross-country regressions. In the second part of this paper, I achieve better
identiﬁcation by looking at the eﬀect of industrial policy reforms within one country.
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(1999). The gravity equation estimates degree of openness as a function of diﬀerences
in population, land area, proximity, and common borders to other countries; it takes
whether a country is landlocked into account. I run a regression which is analogous to
that for entry barriers:
gi,t = β0 + β1OPENi + β2
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
+ β3
(
yi,t−1
yUS,t−1
·OPENi
)
+ di + ft + εit.
In this case, the theory predicts that the interaction coeﬃcient β3 should be positive
(as openness has a more positive eﬀect close to frontier). The results are reported in
columns 5-8, corresponding to columns 1-4 for barriers. The results show, in line with
the predictions of the theory, that openness becomes increasingly important for growth
as a country comes closer to the technology frontier. The estimates of the interaction
coeﬃcient β3 (distance to frontier times openness) are always positive, although only
statistically signiﬁcant in one case.
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In the previous sections, I have discussed the aggregate eﬀects of industrial policy on
growth. I will now shift the focus to a more disaggregated level to discuss heterogeneous
eﬀects of economic reforms. Within the same industrial sector, ﬁrms endowed with dif-
ferent technological capabilities or ﬁrms located in regions with diﬀerent local conditions,
may respond diﬀerentially to the competitive pressure the removal of barriers to entry
impose. In other terms, the eﬀects of liberalization may be unequal —some ﬁrms, regions,
or sectors may beneﬁt whilst others suﬀer. This can lead to growing inequality. In this
section, I discuss some recent research that I conducted jointly with Philippe Aghion,
Robin Burgess, and Steve Redding (2005 and 2008, henceforth ABRZ05 and ABRZ08)
on a series of reforms that took place in India during the 1980s and 1990s.
I modify the benchmark model in two respects. First, I interpret the analysis at
the industry rather than at the economy-wide level. In other words, I think of (1)
as describing the production function at the level of a single industry consisting of a
continuum of intermediate subsectors. Each subsector is populated by a monopolist and
a competitive fringe. For simplicity, I shall ignore general equilibrium eﬀects working
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through industry prices (more formally, I assume that all industries produce perfect
substitute consumption goods).
Second, I assume that intermediate ﬁrms use both unskilled labor and capital (ﬁ-
nal output) as inputs for the production of xt(ν), subject to a constant-returns-to-scale
technology. A ﬁrm now consists of a manager (or entrepreneur), who can decide about
production and investments, and a set of workers. Each ﬁrm generates a surplus that
managers and workers split according to the Nash rule, where the bargaining shares
depend on institutional features (state-speciﬁc labor legislation). I deﬁne β as the the
surplus share appropriated by ﬁrms. The equilibrium proﬁt appropriated by the mo-
nopolist is similar to that of AAZ:
πt(ν) = δ (β)At (ν) ,
where δ is increasing in β.
The nationwide economy is subdivided in a set of segregated markets (states) that
only have technological interactions one with another — I ignore, for instance, labor
and capital mobility —. There are productivity diﬀerences across states within each
industry. In particular, state-industries lie at diﬀerent distances from the industry-
speciﬁc technology frontiers; these distances grow over time at the exogenous rate g in
each industry. Moreover, β can be diﬀerent across states depending on the local labor
market institutions and regulations. Pro-worker regulations are captured by a low β
while pro-employer regulations are captured by a high β.
As before, I consider two industrial policy regimes: high and low competition. In-
dustrial policy may diﬀer across industries (e.g., competition may be low in the textile
industry and high in the metal industry) but the same policy applies across all states in
each industry. With an eye on the empirical application, I will focus on a pro-competitive
reform (slashing entry barriers) that applies economy-wide to selected industries. I con-
sider two diﬀerential eﬀects of the pro-competitive reform:
1. How industry-states lying at diﬀerent distances to the frontier respond to the
reform;
2. How industry-states characterized by diﬀerent labor market regulations respond
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to the reform.
FIGURE 5, (TWO PANELS)
The predictions of the theory about diﬀerential eﬀects across industry-states with dif-
ferent productivity (holding constant labor market regulations) are described in Figure
5. The two panels represent the technological state of a given industry in two (geo-
graphical) states, one more advanced (aadv) and one less advanced (abackw). I assume
aadv > aˆ > abackw in this example. Under the licensing regime (panel a), both states
adopted long-term contracts, emphasizing imitation at the expenses of innovation. Af-
ter the reform (panel b), both switch to short-term contracts. However, the growth
eﬀects diﬀer across the two states. Short-term contracts are appropriate for the more
advanced state experiencing an improvement in its industrial performance. In fact, this
state-industry was about to be absorbed in a non-convergence trap under the licensing
regime. In contrast, long-term contracts were appropriate for the state further from the
technological frontier. This state experiences a worsening of its performance due to the
reform. The pro-competitive reform fosters growth in the state closer to frontier while
harming it in the state farther from frontier. Although other cases are possible, all share
the basic feature of this example. The theory predicts that within each industry, slashing
entry barriers encourages output growth in advanced industry-states and discourages it
in backward industry-states.
Intuitively, the policy reform exacerbates capital market imperfections in the back-
ward state, reducing the cash ﬂow of incumbent ﬁrms and causing a reduction in in-
vestments. Although the change in the contractual regime improves the selection of
entrepreneurial abilities and enhances innovation, the losses outweigh the gains in this
case. The opposite occurs in the advanced state which was about to fall into a non-
convergence trap before the reform; following reform, ﬁrms are rescued as they are now
induced to undertake a more innovation-oriented strategy.
The second dimension is the ﬁrms’ bargaining power in labor markets. Consider
two states across which there are no technological diﬀerences in industry k. Suppose,
that the two states have diﬀerent labor market regulations, say βPE > βPW , namely,
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the former state has a pro-employee legislation (PE) whereas the latter state has a pro-
worker legislation (PW). Both states have the technological level at. The upper panels
in Figure 6 show the PE state before (Figure 6a) and after the reform (Figure 6b).
Under the licensing regime, long-term contracts are adopted ineﬃciently. The reform
reduces the threshold from aPE,LIC to aPE,REF inducing a switch to eﬃcient short-term
contract. In contrast no change in the contractual arrangements is observed in the PW
state (lower panels); short-term contracts prevail eﬃciently both before and after the
reform. In this case, the PE state beneﬁts from the reform, whereas the reform has no
eﬀect in the PW state.
FIGURE 6 (FOUR PANELS)
Next, consider a diﬀerent example in Figure 7. In this case, the PE states adopt
eﬃcient long-term contracts both before and after the reform. Thus, the reform has
no immediate eﬀect (see Figures 7a and 7b). Note, though, that the reform has long
run eﬀects, even in the PE state: the state-industry would have converged to a non-
convergence trap under the licensing regime, whereas the state-industry will converge to
the frontier due to the reform. The situation is very diﬀerent in the PW state. Prior to
reform, the industry adopted eﬃcient long-term contracts. However, the reform reduces
the cash-ﬂow accruing to insider ﬁrms, thus reducing investments. The resulting switch
to short-term contracts is ineﬃcient and slows down growth.
FIGURE 7 (FOUR PANELS)
The following prediction holds across diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations: within each
industry, conditional on the distance to frontier, slashing entry barriers increases the pro-
ductivity growth in pro-employers state-industry relative to pro-workers state-industries.
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The theory can guide the empirical investigation of the eﬀects of the liberalization reform
in India during the 1980s and the 1990s. India is a particularly interesting case for a vari-
ety of reasons. First, it is a very large economy that stagnated until the 1980s and started
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growing at a high sustained rate thereafter. How India managed to shift the gears of its
economic performance has been the subject of a heated debate. The mainstream view
is that the Indian miracle is the ultimate evidence of the beneﬁts of economic reforms.
This interpretation is controversial, however. Rodrik and Subramaniam (2004), for ex-
ample, note that the engine of Indian growth got started in the earlier 1980s, well before
any major economic reform was introduced (the major wave of liberalization, such as
the trade reform, dates from the early 1990s). Second, India is very interesting because
it experienced a Copernican revolution in industrial policy. After obtaining indepen-
dence in 1947, India had chosen to remain a relatively closed economy with an extensive
role for central planning of industry. The key of centrally-planned industrialization in
India was the Industries Act of 1951 which brought all key industries in the registered
manufacturing sector under central government control via industrial licensing. The
Act required an industrial license for establishing a new factory, signiﬁcantly expanding
capacity, starting a new product line or changing location. During the 1980s and the
1990s, India underwent two waves of reforms. The ﬁrst occurred in 1985 after Rajiv
Gandhi’s rise to power. The second was launched in 1991 under Narasimha Rao, who
came to power following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. These reforms had a landmark
character, representing a discrete break with the past. Third, India has a unique set
of sources of internal institutional variation that enable researchers to evaluate reforms
more credibly than elsewhere. In particular, Indian states have a considerable degree of
political autonomy resulting, among other things, in diﬀerent labor market regulations.
One can speciﬁcally study the interaction between national industrial policy and state
labor market institutions. Finally, the industrial policy reform did not occur simultane-
ously in all industries. Thus, one can exploit both the cross-state institutional variation
and the time variation across industry of the industrial policy reforms.
The empirical analysis is based on ABRZ05 and ABRZ08, where we measure entry
liberalization by constructing a delicensing measure which records when a given 3-digit
industry was delicensed. Motivated by the theories discussed above, one can ask two sets
of questions. First, what is the eﬀect of entry liberalization on industrial performance
(both level and inequality). Second, how does the eﬀect of industrial policy reforms
interact with the state of technology (close vs. far from frontier) and state-speciﬁc labor
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market institutions?
As a ﬁrst step, ABRZ05 run regressions of the form:
yit = dit + βt + ηi + uit
where i denotes a 3-digit (registered) manufacturing industry and t year, yit is an eco-
nomic outcome of interest (see below), dit is a 0/1 dummy which switches on when a
3-digit industry is delicensed, βt is a year dummy that controls for common macroeco-
nomic shocks and will capture the overall eﬀects of the 1985 and 1991 liberalizations
across all 3-digit industries, ηi is an industry ﬁxed eﬀect that controls for unobserved
heterogeneity across 3-digit industries, and uit is a stochastic error. This is a “diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences” speciﬁcation, where the eﬀect of delicensing is identiﬁed from the diﬀer-
ential change over time in the economic outcome in industries which delicense relative
to industries where compulsory industrial licensing is retained.
TABLE 3
Performance variables include the number of factories, output, productivity and the
respective standard deviation. The results reported in Table 3 show a substantial in-
crease in the number of factories and of the inequality in the industrial performance
(as measured by the standard deviation of output, labor productivity and total factor
productivity). The increase in the number of factories is not surprising, since the reform
removed the licensing system and other barriers to entry. It is remarkable, however,
that we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant average eﬀects of the reforms on other measures
of economic performance such as output, employment or productivity (see ABRZ08 for
detailed results). The industrial policy reform do not appear to have had a signiﬁcant
impact on the industrial performance, on average, although they did increase the in-
equality of economic performance, measured by both output, labor productivity and
total factor productivity.
This ﬁnding of rising inequality following entry liberalization is consistent with the
theory which emphasizes how a common reform may have uneven eﬀects on the perfor-
mance of state-industries within a given industrial sector. In ABRZ08) I explore how a
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state-industry’s distance to the Indian technological frontier and how state speciﬁc la-
bor market institutions can help understand increased inequality within 3-digit industry
from 1980-1997. There, we run the following regression:
yist = αis + βst + ηit
+κHHist + ξHHistdit + κLList + ξLListdit (7)
+µrst + θ(rst)(dit) + εist,
where yist is output at the three-digit state-industry level,Hist (List) is a high-productivity
(low-productivity) dummy which takes the value one if a state-industry lies in the top
(bottom) tercile of the cross-state within-industry productivity distribution each year
and zero otherwise, dit is as before a dummy variable which switches on in the year a
three-digit industry is delicensed, αis are state-industry ﬁxed eﬀects which control for
any unobserved time-invariant determinants of state-industry performance (e.g. nat-
ural endowments, location), βst are state-year dummies which control for state-speciﬁc
macroeconomic shocks, ηit are industry-year interactions and εist is a stochastic error.
rst is the labor regulation measure measured in state s at time t.
10 State-speciﬁc la-
bor market regulations are measured by extending the measure proposed by Besley and
Burgess (2004). See ABRZ08 for more details.
Note that the speciﬁcation in (7) precludes estimating the level eﬀects of the reform
(as well as the eﬀect of labor regulations) since these eﬀects are absorbed by the set
of state-industry, state-time, and industry-time dummies. However, we also run a less
demanding speciﬁcation which only included industry-state and time trend and allowed
us to identify the average eﬀects of the reform and of labor regulation. In line with the
discussion above, the average eﬀect of the reform on economic performance turns out to
be positive, but small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
TABLE 4
10Here, I will only discuss the results when output is the dependent variable. We also looked at
employment and ﬁxed capital, and obtained similar results.
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The main coeﬃcient of interests are the interaction eﬀects ξH , ξL and θ. ξH and ξL
capture the relationship between post-reform economic performance and distance to fron-
tier. Since the second tercile is the omitted group, the theory predicts ξH to be positive
and ξL to be negative. The estimation conforms with the theoretical predictions (see Ta-
ble 4). Slashing barriers improved the performance of high-productivity state-industries
(relative to the medium-productivity reference group) and worsened the performance of
high-productivity state-industries (again, relative to the medium-productivity reference
group). This conﬁrms that the reforms had unequal eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient θ captures the interaction between state-speciﬁc labor regulations
and the impact of the liberalization. The estimated coeﬃcient is negative and highly
signiﬁcant. This implies that when delicensing occurred, industries in states with pro-
employer regulation experienced larger increases in output relative to those located in
pro-worker states. The result is robust to controlling for a large number of sociopolitical
and economic covariates (and their interaction with the reforms) and to taking the
possible endogeneity of the labor market regulations into account. It is also robust to a
variety of strategies for clustering standard errors and for addressing other econometric
concerns.
6 C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
In this paper, I presented a simple theory that oﬀers a uniﬁed framework for the analysis
of economic growth and economic development. The key assumption is that economic
growth in relatively backward economies is associated with adoption and imitation of
and investment in existing technologies, while innovation drives growth in advanced
economies. In the theory, the nature of contractual relationships evolves with economic
growth. Although this evolution tends to adapt to and promote economic development,
there is no guarantee of success. The theory shows why the process of technological con-
vergence can come to a halt, and which policies and reform are necessary for restoring
growth. I applied the theory to the experience of a number of developed and devel-
oping countries and focused in particular on the analysis of the process of economic
liberalization in India.
The notion of appropriate institutions can be extended beyond the applications con-
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sidered in this paper. For instance, one can apply it to labor market relations and internal
organization of ﬁrms in the developed world. For instance, Western European countries
have traditionally adopted a rigid model characterized by long-term employment rela-
tions and low employment turnover. Policies making it costly for ﬁrms to dismiss workers
are part of this model. Until the 1970s, Europe experienced high growth and low un-
employment, but has since lagged behind the United States over the last two decades.
Long-term employment relations seem to have strengthened incentives for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments, initially with beneﬁcial eﬀects (for instance, we see more ﬁrm-level-training
in Europe than in the US). However, as Europe approached the technology frontier, its
model entered a crisis. Flexibility and good matches between workers and ﬁrms become
more important when innovation is the main source of growth. Globalization and the
IT revolution seem to have reinforced this tendency.
The same technological transformations shape the internal organization of ﬁrms.
Globalization and the recent technological development seem to have favored more de-
centralized ﬁrms. In Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007), we
propose and test a theory where ﬁrms far from the frontier adopt more rigid and central-
ized organizational forms than those close to the frontier. Technologically backward ﬁrms
increase their productivity by adopting well-established technologies, and can learn the
most productive way to implement them from the experience of more advanced ﬁrms
in similar lines of business. For such ﬁrms, rigid hierarchical organizations can work
relatively well, as innovation is not yet a daunting challenge. As ﬁrms approach the
technological frontier, however, they can no longer just learn from other ﬁrms’ experi-
ence. Instead, they must innovate and open new avenues. At that stage, it becomes
crucial to delegate more authority to managers, who possess better knowledge and infor-
mation, and who must be allowed to act quickly and eﬀectively. However, this delegation
comes at a cost: local managers and shareholders have often conﬂicting objectives, and
the managers can use the authority which is delegated to them to make choices that are
not in the best interest of the shareholders. Our empirical analysis supports this theory
using three diﬀerent datasets of French and British ﬁrms.
Another aspect of the internal organization of ﬁrms is the extent of vertical inte-
gration in relationship with the process of technological convergence. This is analyzed
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theoretically in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2004) and empirically in Acemoglu,
Aghion, Griﬃth and Zilibotti (2003), using a panel data set of UK ﬁrms during the
period 1980-2000. We document a negative correlation between vertical integration and
the interaction between closeness of a ﬁrm to the technological frontier of its four-digit
industry and the R&D intensity of its suppliers. The evidence suggests that as inno-
vation becomes more important, there may indeed be shift from vertical integration to
outsourcing.11
Other applications of the theory include ﬁnancial development — see, e.g., Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997 and 1999) — and
education (Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) and Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and
Vandenbussche (2005)). In Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), countries with a
suﬃcient level of ﬁnancial development converge to the growth rate of the technology
frontier, whereas ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries grow at a lower rate, even in the
long run. In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) ﬁnancial development is endogenous to the
growth process. Lack of ﬁnancial development restricts diversiﬁcation opportunities and
deter high-productivity risky invesments.
In summary, the process of economic development and technological change trans-
forms economic relationships in a complex fashion in many spheres, including the or-
ganization of production, institutions, and policies — and even culture and values (see,
e.g., Doepke and Zilibotti 2008). Acknowledging such complexity should not make us
agnostic: some sequences of policies and institutions have fared better than others in
promoting growth and development. More rigid institutions and organizations seem
successful at generating high investment and technology adoption at an early stage of
development, but pro-competitive reforms favoring an environment conducive to innova-
tion must follow at the appropriate time. Such a sequence neither matches the rhetoric
of market-enthusiasts nor that of market-skeptics in the heated public debate on glob-
alization and growth.
11Other applications of the theory that I do not discussed in this paper include ﬁnancial development
— see, e.g., Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997 and 1999) for
its forebears — and education (Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) and Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby
and Vandenbussche (2005)).
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per worker in the U.S., both calculated at the beginning of each period. The independent variable "Barriers" is the 
"procedure measure", from Djankov et al. (2002), which measures the number of procedures necessary to open a business  
(see AAZ, p.43). The independent variable "Openness" is the predicted openness from the gravity equation in Frenkel and 
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Redding, and Zilibotti (2005), p.299.
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